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Abstract 
This paper presents both a case study of the land history of Hong Kong and a model that 
highlights how a self-enforcing land-supply policy may emerge. A simple dynamic model 
ofself-fulfilling expectation ofland supply is presented to illustrate the insight behind this 
tug-of-war between housing owners and potential buyers. We show that the land-supply 
policy is self-enforcing ifit raises the expected future rental prices so that the median voter 
purchases housing. The cycle is completed if the median voter, who has vested interests in 
the housing market, determines the land-supply policy. By the same logic, if the median 
voter does not purchase housing due to low expectations on fliture rental prices, it is in 
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In 2003, the average living area of each household in Hong Kong was 42 m^, which 
is much smaller than that in other Asian metropolises. In Tokyo, for example, living spaces 
average 62 m^，97 m^ in Singapore, and 104 m^ in Taipei (Wong, 2009). Furthermore, 
the total land area ofHong Kong is 390 km^ , which is larger than that of Singapore.' In 
contrast to the congested living conditions, however, the undeveloped land in Hong Kong, 
which belongs to the government, is above 76 percent of its total land area? Thus, with this 
near monopoly ofland supply, the government ofHong Kong has tremendous power over 
the housing market. 
When land supply is a policy variable, the politics of determining land supply natu-
r a l ly involve a tug-of-war between housing owners and potential housing buyers in a dy-
namic environment. Hong Kong is not the only country whose government has the power 
to control the land supply. For example, the governments of China and Singapore also own 
all the land ofthe country and completely control land disposals. To some lesser degree, 
urban planning tools such as land regulations and growth controls can be used to control 
land supply in a metropolitan area (Glaeser, Gyourko and Raven, 2005). The theoretical 
literature concerning land political economics also shows that land regulation and control 
have effects on the values ofproperty and the returns from owning it (Capozza and Sick, 
1 The total land area ofSingapore is710.2 km^ (Yearbook ofStatistics Singapore, 2009) while that ofHong 
Kong is 1108 km^ (Hong Kong Annual Digest ofStatistics, 2009). 
2 The undeveloped land amounts to 847 km^ ,including the land used for agriculture, woodland, shrubland, 
grassland, wetlands, barren lands, and water bodies (Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, 2009). 
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1994; Riddiough, 1997; Mayo and Sheppard, 2001). Nevertheless, two events in the recent 
history ofHong Kong are particularly illuminating in view of this conflict ofinterest. 
The Sino-British Joint Declaration, signed by the governments of the United King-
dom (UK) and China in 1985, is the first ofthe two events. In the declaration, the British 
government ofHong Kong is not allowed to sell more than 50 hectares ofland per year for 
the usage excluding public housing until 1997, which is the prescribed time for the han-
dover of sovereignty of Hong Kong to China. Under this supply-reduction land policy, 
housing prices immediately took off and the average appreciation rate rose to 11 percent, 
much more than the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita from 1985 to 
1997. 
The second event is the so-called "85,000 Planning" policy, which was announced 
right after the transfer to sovereignty in July 1997 by the new Hong Kong government 
(Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, HKSAR). The policy was obviously a re-
sponse to the public outcry against sky-high housing prices and aimed to increase the land 
and housing supply. It "set a long-term housing target, in which starting from 1999-2000, 
to build not less than 85,000 public and private flats a year."] However, private housing de-
valuated rapidly and the new policy became unpopular almost immediately. Under huge 
pressure from both media opinions and polls, the policy was abandoned. In 2003, the gov-
ernment made a statement about withdrawing from their role as developers and temporarily 
stopped land supply. Housing prices thus started to rise again. 
3 Chief Executive's Policy Address, 1997 
http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/pa97/englishy^paindex.htm 
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The effects of these two events on housing prices is clear from Figure 1, which de-
picts the real housing price index for private housing from 1976 to 2008. From 1985 to 
1997, the period, within which the Joint Declaration was in force, we can find constant 
boosts in housing prices. The housing price index in 1994 is four times higher than that in 
1988. After 1997, residential rapidly devaluated until 2003, coinciding with the “85,000 
Planning" policy, at a rate of over 10 percent every year. 
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Fig. 1. Real Housing Price Index 
(Source: Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics) 
What have we learned from these two events? As housing is both a durable good 
and an asset, the fact that Sino-British Joint Declaration limitations raised housing prices 
is an indication that the public's expectations of future housing and rental prices must be 
high so that it is worthwhile to purchase houses. From the point of view of consumption 
smoothing, every individual would purchase ownership. However, ownership is limited 
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only to those who are wealthy enough to buy houses, because ofthe imperfect divisibility 
ofhousing units. For those who currently rent but can potentially buy housing ownership, 
rising housing prices make their future prospects look worse, which is the reason for the 
public outcry against "sky-high" housing prices. Even so, the expectation may be still on 
the rising side ifthey do not expect the politics to overturn the stringent limitations on land 
supply. 
Ifthe government responds to the rising hatred of those not so wealthy toward those 
very wealthy such that the land and housing supply is increased, expectations of future 
housing and rental prices will change yet again. This is certainly against the interest of 
those who have previously bought housing, especially those whojust bought houses before 
1997 based on expectations of rising housing prices. To illustrate, suppose an individual 
is expecting housing prices to continue to rise after 1997, and s/he has just accumulated 
enough money to purchase a house in 1996 or 1997. This person may have borrowed 
money from the bank, hoping that the future rental income may bring him overall surplus. 
Unfortunately, the market crashed all ofa sudden in 1997. What then will this person think 
ofthe government? Although Hong Kong is not a full democracy in terms ofits election 
institutions, people in Hong Kong enjoy the foll freedoms ofspeech and press. The govern-
ment ofHong Kong cares a great deal about media opinions and polls. One can imagine, as 
illustrated in the median voter's theorem, that there is a pivotal voice in the media or polls, 
and this is likely that of those who are within the median income level. (Black Duncan, 
1948) Given that Hong Kong is not a full democracy, perhaps those individuals who can be 
considered as pivotal to shaping the land market are those slightly higher than the median. 
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History shows that the expectation of rising prices withheld itself, as the governor 
who announced and executed the "85,000" policy did not enjoy much popularity over his 
entire term and resigned early. Obviously, the first governor did not see this coming, as 
no governor would like to lose his popularity when he stepped on the stage. His successor 
returned to a more stringent land supply policy and the housing price started to rise again.^ 
The abortion of "85,000 Planning" indicates that the expectation is self-enforced, in our 
interpretation, by the fact that a person with a medium income (or one slightly higher) 
expected rising housing prices and purchased one and, thus, vesting hisAier interest in it. 
This paper presents a careful case study of Hong Kong's recent land history high-
lighted by the two events above. We also develop a simple two-period dynamic model 
which incorporate both the rental and housing ownership markets to illustrate this self-
fulfilling expectation. 
Brueckner (1990) proves that urban growth control is a result ofthe political struggle 
between the owners of developed and undeveloped lands. The owners of developed land 
want to restrict the urban growth while their opposition likes quick growth ofurban. In the 
case oflandlords ofdeveloped land with political clout, a development ban may be imposed 
even ifit reduces social welfare. Glaeser, Gyourko and Raven (2005) set a dynamic model 
that interprets the level ofdevelopment as depending on the lobbying oflandlords, which 
build and sell housing on their land, and homeowners buying housing from landlords. For 
homeowners, new development projects increase population density, decrease their utility, 
and have negative impacts on the appreciation ofhouse prices. However, the landlords hope 
4 See more details of this story in Chapter 2. 
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for higher level of development to run their business. Our model has the similar logic as 
all these studies, but the tug-of-war is between homeowners and renters and we emphasize 
the self-fulfillment of land supply. 
Some prior empirical research on Hong Kong paid attention to the impact ofdevelop-
ment control and regulation on housing supply and housing prices, indicating that restric-
tions on development induce higher prices and smaller housing supply, as demonstrated 
by studies by Tse et al. (1999), Hui (2001)，and Hui et al. (2005). Empirical evidence 
from Tse (1998) and Quigley and Swoboda (2006) proved that restricted land supply max-
imizes landowners' profits and causes welfare redistribution, which support our view that 
landowners prefer smaller land supply to gain more profits. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 conducts a case study 
of Hong Kong's recent land and housing policies and markets in detail, particularly on 
the connections between policy amendment and changes in the market. In Chapter 3, we 
develop a theory ofthe political economy ofland supply that illustrates the mechanism of 
self-fulfilling expectations via medium voters. Chapter 4 concludes. 
Chapter 2 
A Case Study ofthe Land Market in Hong 
Kong 
2.1 Background 
Hong Kong is comprised ofHong Kong Island, Kowloon, the New Territories, and outlying 
islands. In the 19th century, the British government obtained the land ofHong Kong from 
the Qing dynasty. To meet the needs ofBritish merchants and solve the financial problems 
ofthe new colonial authority, the British government began selling land-use right in 1841. 
Earlier developments agglomerated in Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula, so 
the undeveloped lands were mostly concentrated in the New Territories Q^issim, 2008). 
Thus, the population density ofKowloon grew to about 43,970 people/km^, 14 times as 
high as that in the New Territories and outlying islands.^ With respect ofland use, only 261 
km ofland was developed out ofthe total land area ofl ,108 km , where less than 7 percent 
ofthe total land was developed for residential purposes.^ 
2.2 Institutions related to the land market 
5 The population densities of Hong Kong Island and the New Territories and outlying islands are 16,220 
and 3,820 people/km^, respectively (Hong Kong in Figures, 2010). 
6 The area of land used for residential is 75 km^ which is comprised of 25 km^ for private residential use, 
16km2 for public residential use, and 34 km^ for rural settlements. The total land area is 1,108 km . (Hong 
Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, 2009). 
7 
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2.2.1 Land Disposals 
The Hong Kong government adopts a leasehold land tenure system, which means that the 
government owns all the land and what to lease actually is the limited right to use land 
within a period ofvalidity (Hui and Soo, 2002). At the beginning of each financial year, 
the government publishes the details ofland available for lease during the year, as well as 
the estimated amount of land expected to be put under lease in the next four years. When 
the right ofland development expires, the cost of extending the rent is pegged at an annual 
rent of 3 percent of the rateable value of the property. The lease may not be renewed on 
the grounds of inefficient use of the land or violation of land restrictions by the lessee, 
The same is true ifthe government determines that the HKSAR needs the land for public 
use. However, resumption repossessing these lands still requires the government to pay 
compensation, the value ofwhich depends on the adjudication of the government. 
Currently, the Hong Kong government disposes land through auctions and private 
treaty grants. The land for commercial market uses, such as private housing, is sold through 
auctions. A private treaty grant is issued to meet specific policy objectives, such as public 
housing, non-profit community usage, and special promotion projects. Compared to prices 
in auctions for private housing, land premiums in private treaties for public housing are 
fixed at very low rates. 
When one purchases a piece of land from the government, the payments include 
premiums at the market land price and government rent. Lessees have to pay premiums on 
the date oflease, while government rent is annually paid to maintain the contract. Revenues 
2.2 Institutions related to the land market 9 
from land sales represent 17.4 percent ofthe government's total income.? Therefore, the 
government needs to balance its own interests and that of other parties when formulating 
and implementing land and housing policies. 
2.2.2 Public Housing 
It is obvious that the government can influence the private-housing sector by controlling 
land supply and prices. As mentioned above, the government also takes part in the pub-
lic housing market for medium to low income residents, thus also affecting the market 
for private housing. The earliest public housing was built to help more than 50,000 citi-
zens who lost their homes to a fire. In 1961, the government's low-cost housing program 
was officially introduced. Public housing comprised public rental housing leased only to 
eligible low-income households, and subsidized sale flats sold to households oflow and 
middle income. Renters and buyers in the public residential market need to satisfy a se_ 
ries of criteria to verify their income status. Two organizations, the Hong Kong Housing 
Authority (HKHA), an independent statutory body of the Hong Kong government, and the 
Hong Kong Housing Society (HKHS), a non-govemment and non-profit organization, are 
responsible for planning, constructing, and managing different types of public housing. 
The majority ofpublic housing is provided by the HKHA.^ 
7 The total government revenue is HKD 358,465 million, of which land premiums and property taxes 
amount to HKD 62,318million.(Hong Kong Annual Digest ofStatistics, 2008) 
8 Refer to the section Housing in Hong Kong: The Facts 2009 and the introduction from the Housing 
Aut(hh°tI|)^/www.housingauthority.gov.hk^5/aboutus/resources/progress/0’,，00.html) 
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By the end of 2008，the overall housing stock in terms of housing units totaled 
about 2,509,900 flats, comprised of733,500 public rental housing flats, 395,700 subsidized 
home-ownership flats, and 1,380,800 flats in the private sector.^ In 2009, 47.1 percent of 
Hong Kong's population lived in public housing, 29.1 percent of which resided in public 
rental hous ing, 
2.3 Recent Land and Housing Market History 
The city, which has a population of seven million，has experienced steady population 
growth over the last few years. The housing supply, however, has not grown to match 
population growth. Figure 2 shows the growth rate of population and the stock ofhousing 
from 1978 to 2008. Although the decreasing growth rate ofthe housing stock is partially 
due to the slowing population growth, the gap between the two has gradually declined and 
has even reached negative at a certain times. 
9 Hong Kong Property Review 2009 
10 See Housing in Figure 2009 . . ^^^^^^^^ , . 
(http://www.housingauthority.gov.hk/hdw/coment/document/en/aboutus/rMources/statistics/HIF2009.pdt) 
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Fig. 2. Growth Rate ofPopulation and the Stock ofHousing 
(Source: Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics) 
2.3.1 Land Supply and Land Prices 
Figure 3 demonstrates land disposal history to prove that the government leases land every 
year but the amount is rather small On average, land disposal for housing was only 0.43 
km2 per year from 1979 to 2008. Nevertheless, the amounts of disposal are not consistent; 
they were small in the period from 1986 to 1994, increasing to approximately double before 
finally falling to almost zero in 2003. 
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(Source: Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics) 
The government's land and housing policy can explain this trend in land disposal. 
In preparation for British's transfer of sovereignty to China in 1997, the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration was signed in May 1985, and included the following provision, "From the 
entry into force ofthe Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997, the amount of new lease can 
not exceed 50 hectares a year, which excludes land granted for public rental housing. The 
additional quota needs the Land Commission's seal ofapproval, which is made up the equal 
number ofofficials from British Government and Chinese Government".'' 
A size of 50 hectares per year was viewed as a constraint on land supply, which is 
commonly seen as a main factor that constrains the housing supply. From 1985 to 1994, 
I ‘ See The Joint Declaration Annex III 
Land Leases (http://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/jd5.htm) 
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except for special purposes, such as the Hong Kong International Airport, the amount of 
land for lease was restricted to 50 hectares per year.'^ 
Although the land leased for public housing is not limited in the Joint Declaration, the 
average land disposal for public housing was 10 hectares less than that for private housing 
during the same period. Moreover, 137 hectares out ofthe 184 hectares for disposal for 
public housing from 1988 to 1994 had not been developed until 1996.'^ 
As a result ofthe constrained land supply, the first land disposal after the Joint Dec-
laration, which failed to be sold in 1982 due to extremely low auction prices, was leased at 
a price 40 percent higher than the reserved price (Feng, 2001). The price of residential land 
b o ^ e d from HKD 762 per square foot in 1984 to HKD 1,438 in 1985. At the same time, 
private residential prices immediately rose by 20 percent in 1985 and kept soaring for 12 
years as shown in Figurel. The mortgage payment for a flat of 450 square feet accounted 
for 87 percent ofthe median household income in 1997, whereas the ratio in 2008 was only 
35percent.'^ 
The government began to slightly loosen the limit ofland disposal in 1995 and 1996 
to relieve the housing mania. The purpose ofthe land policy became obvious in October 
1997 with the announcement ofthe “85,000 Planning policy". The government stated that 
the limited land supply policy could not meet the needs ofhomeownership and published 
the details ofafive-year land sales schedule that included supplying 120 hectares ofland 
12 Hong Kong. Legislative Council Secretariat Report on Land Supply in Hong Kong 1997 
13 The report on public housing policy (http://www.hkph.org/main/articles/199509-02.html) 
14 The ratio is based on the assumption that private households with median household incomes buy a flat 
o f 4 5 square meters, and take out a 20-year mortgage loan at a 70 percent loan-to-value ratio and an average 
effective mortgage rate. (Press Leases ofLegislative Council, LCQ10: Property mortgage loans) 
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for private housing before March 1999, 260 hectares more in the next three years, and an 
additional 285 hectares specifically for public residential." 
The "85,000 Planning" policy was effective in decreasing housing prices, which is 
what it aimed to do. Figure 4 shows the real housing rent index for both the private and 
public sectors, and the average price of land disposal for residential from 1979 to 2008’ 
The figure shows a clear decrease from 1997.'^ 
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(Source: Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics) 
Unfortunately, the rate of decrease was much more than the government had an-
ticipated. Private housing prices slumped by 70 percent to its lowest in 2003 compared 
15 Chief Executive's Policy Address 1997 
16 in 2003, the government did not sell land for residential use. From 2004 onwards, residential price was 
higher than' ever partially because of new land disposal policies dedicated mainly for luxury housing, as 
indicated in the land sales record o f L a n d Department (http://www.landsd.gov.hk/en/landsale/records.htm). 
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to that in 1997. Most homeowners, especially the middle-income group, usually bought 
estates with a 70-percent mortgage loan, which meant that their properties tumed into neg-
ative equities and caused great losses in their wealth when housing prices fell after “85,000 
Planning". In June 2003，there were 105,697 residential mortgage loans in negative equity, 
accounting for about 22 percent ofall mortgage loans and involving HKD 16,500 m i l l i o n " 
The government began to realize that "the sharp fall in property prices has hit pub-
lic confidence. If this trend continues, it will put pressure on the banking system."'^ The 
government took back its promise and switched the direction of policy yet again. Begin-
ning in 2003, the government suspended the regular auction ofland for a specified time, 
and stopped selling and building subsidized public residential units. The application list 
system was adopted to lease land, where developers initially selected the sites from the Ap-
plication List, after which the government held an auction if the proposed price meets the 
triggering threshold of80 percent ofthe Open Market Value of the government assessment. 
The turnover of land transaction plunged significantly. On the one hand, developers had 
no incentive to aggressively increase land supply, which will positively reduce their profits. 
This reason was gradually affected less and less by the land stock the developers contin-
uously devoured and their growing demand for land to develop. On the other hand, the 
government set triggering prices that were too high to meet. For example, the site in Ho 
Man Tin that sold at a resumed regular land auction in 2010, was unsuccessfully applied 
for 21 times in the last 3 years.. 
17 See the report "Residential mortgage loans in negative equity June quarter" published by the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority 
18 Chief Executive's Policy Address 1998 
http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/pa98/englishy'paindex.htm 
Chapter 3 
A Theory ofPolitical Economy ofLand Supply 
3.1 Model Setup 
The model investigates the determination ofland supply in a simple dynamic environment 
consisting ofboth the housing rental and the housing ownership markets. There are two 
periods and three types of consumers i 二 r ,m,p, , each of which is measured in units 
measure, a continuum. Thus, each individual is a negligible point in the continuum, which 
has a fixed income in period t 二 1,2 w!. In each period t, w^ > w^ > wf. Here, r 
stands for the rich, m fdr the medium income, and p for the poor. The government initially 
owns all of land, and the total land endowment is 7- For simplicity, we Ssume that the 
land supply in period 1 is exogenously set as 71 < 7, and the reservation price is zero. 
We abstract away housing construction and assume that the area ofland equals the area of 
housing. 
The politics in this model involves this exogenously given 71, and the median voter's 
decision on the additional land supply in period 2，72 < 7 _ 7i- Besides the housing 
consumption decisions in both periods, the consumers make their ownership purchase de-
cisions in period 1, and the median voter (obviously it is one of the medium income con-
sumers) decides how much 72 to supply to the housing market. Although the median voter 
knows how 72 is determined afterwards, we don't think he/she can take 72 into considera-
16 
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tion in period 1. Due to the median voter as a point in the continuum of group m，if he/she 
believes that all other people in his/her group is going to generate specific expectations on 
72, the median voter has no way to break it up but to follow what he/she should do un-
der the expectation. Note that there is no ownership market in the second period, as it is 
the last period so that renting and owning do not make a difference. Thus, without loss of 
generality, we simply let the additional land supply 72 be owned by the government. In 
principle, one may allow the 71 to be determined by the median voter, as well. The key 
question in this thesis, however, concerns how the land ownership market is influenced by 
the expectation in 72. For this purpose, we let 71 be exogenous for tractability. 
Each type ofconsumers has the same preference, given by the utility function 
y = ln Ui + ln U2, (3.1) 
Ut = c]-^h-. 
where c^  represents numeraire goods, ht is the housing consumption, and a 6 (0,1). The 
discount rate is assumed to be zero for simplicity. The superscript for types is suppressed 
here because this problem applies to them in the same way. We also assume that no com-
mitment can be made, there is no borrowing and lending, and hence households solve their 
utility maximization problem by backward induction and period-by-period budget con-
straint. 
In the first period, households choose /ii, ci, and £, the land ownership. In period 2， 
given the i made in period 1, each consumers with period 2 income w2 solves 
m a x % = 4 - " ¾ (3.2) 
c2,h2 
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S,t. C2 + R2h2 = U)2 + R2^: 
where 7¾ is the rental price in period 2. The solution is 
Z 
1 一 CX(W2 + R2^) 
《 彻 — 彻 ， (3.3) 
石二（1 — ^ 0(秘2 + 只20-
� 
With the above solutions in period 2, each consumer with income flows wi and w2 
solves 
m a x y 二 l n ( c J - ^ / i ? ) + l n ( c 2 W , ^ W ) (3 .4 ) 
ciM/ 
s.t. ci + Rihi + Pi = wi + Rii, 
£>£or£ = Q. 
where P is the housing price, Ri the rental price in period 1’ and 1 is the minimum 
requirement ofhousing area in the ownership trade, which implies that the total demand 
curve will no longer be continuous. This is a plausible assumption since the housing units 
in reality is not perfectly divisible. This friction makes positive land ownership difficult for 
those whose incomes are low. The solution is 
f 
7 — ^ \ _ J£2_ 
^ 一 2(P-Ri) 2R|， 
< t 一 alwi-(P-Ri)T] (3.5) 
几1 — Wi , 
、3"1二 (1 — 00(切1 + 丑2乃. 
where R^ is the expectation on rental price in period 2. 
The model is completed by the market clearing condition represented below: 
r,m,p 
D' = Y.t[P,Ri.R2) = S' = i , P.6) 
T ffi, j) 
树 = 5 > 1 (尸，凡，场 )二对二 "二 7 1 (3") 
r,m,p 
D^ = ；^均(尸’风’拖）=4" = 72 + 71 (3.8) 
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where equation (3.6)-(3.8) respectively denote the market equilibrium in the ownership 
market and rental market in two periods. 
Given i^{Rl) , the median voter, who is a member of the medium income group, 
futhermore solves 
m a x ^2 二 c l ' ^ h ^ ( 3 . 9 ) 
C 2 > 2 , 7 2 
S.t, C2 + R2b2)h2 = W2 + ^(72)^^(^2) 
where R2{l2) is the solution to the rental market clearing condition in period 2 (3.8). 
3.2 Definition of Equilibrium 
An equilibrium is a set of {c j , h^,t Ru P. l2^ll l r r , m , P ; t = i , 2 such that the following five 
conditions hold. 
(a) Given { l \ R2]. M , ^ } solves (3.2). Denote the solution of {c^, /¾} as functions 
o f t and R2, i.e.,瑪0^\ 拖),场(於，胁 
(b) Given { R u R l P . ^ 2 i ^ \ R 2 ) M ^ \ m ^ { c [ A . ^ } solves (3.4). Denote the 
solution of {c l , / i l , f } as functions of R u R ^ P . i.e.,苟(风，^^ ，巧，对(风，尺，’尸)， d^ 
f ( i ^ i , i ^ l , P ) . 
(c) Given h{(Ru Rl P\ ?(风，丑^，巧’ ^nd R|, {Ri,P} solves the market clearing 
conditions (3.6-3.7). Denote the solutions as Ri(R|) and P ( i ^ ) . 
( d ) G i v e n i ^ a n d 7 2 ’ 4 ( ? ( S ; U ^ ) , ^ e 2，A ^ ^ , ^ ’ ^ ^ H ^ ( ^， ^ ,A ^ )， ^ )’^ ( ^ ^ ) 
and P(R | ) , R2 solves the market clearing conditions (3.8). Denote this equilibrium rental 
price in the second period as /¾ = R2{R2^ 72). 
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(e) Given R^ and R^ = %{Rl,l2)^ 72,solves the median voter problem (3.9). De-
note the solution as 7^ = %{Rl)- Hence, the equilibrium rental price in the second period 
is R l = M R l . % [ R l ) ) = K R l ) -
An equilibrium is called a self-fulfilling equilibrium if one additional condition holds: 
(f) The equilibrium expectation R^ is such that R^ 二 A(i^) 二 i ^ . 
It is reasonable to consider a self-fulfilling equilibrium, because under this world 
which no uncertainty is present, people should be able to form correct expectations on the 
equilibrium land supply and hence rental price in the second period. 
3.3 Equilibrium Characterization 
We consider the case where the group r with the highest income is wealthy enough to buy 
housing, and the poorest group p will never buy housing because their income is so low. 
What is to be examined is the behavior ofthe middle-income group m, who may be tenant 
or owner under different housing and rental price. Thus, we need to analyze group m,s 
ownership decision £爪 via their indirect utility function. By plugging (3.3) and (3.5) into 
(3.1), we obtain 
y - 二 2 l n � " ( l — 4 ( i - " ) + l n [ < — (P — ^ i ) n + ln « + 明 
{R1R2)^ 
The first and second-order derivative of V^ with respect to 广 are 
爪，^ 1 1 
乂“‘(广)^ im-wT/{P-R1)^^ + ^2/R2 
1 1 
\rmlt(nm\ — , _ �„ <- U 
^ ( € ) — [ ^ m _ ^ m / ( p _ ^ ) ] 2 (^ m + yj^|Rlf ' 
3.3 Equilibrium Characterization : 1 
Due to the discontinuity created by the existence of^, we distinguish the following 
three cases. 
(Case 1): lfV^'{l) > 0, then 
£m _ ^m 
(Case 2): lfV^'[l) < 0 and V^{0) < V^{i), then 
r 二 i 
(Case 3): lfV^'{l) < 0 and 7^ (0 ) > V^{I), then 
r 二 0 
That is, the group m as a price taker faces his demand curve in first period as follow-
ing: 
^ fi| . w^+Rfi/2 
0， T ^ i � w Y ^ - ( P - R i W 2 , 
,m 一 < + E | ^ 2 . _ ^ < w^+lR^^ (3.10) 
^ = A ^ - - ( P - R i K / 2 - p-Ri - ^ r - ( ^ - ^ i ) ^ ' 
7m ^ r ^2 _ R i _ > < + 鄉 
�亿 二 2 (P -Ri ) _ _ ， P - H i ^ ^ r - ( P - H i ) r 
The conditions are also suitable for group r and p. In our model, we have assumed 
that group r will buy the ownership t and P = 0，no matter what group m behave, which 
implies that 
wl + R',i/2 J ^ < + —�Rl 
w\ — {P — i^iK/2 � P-Ri wT - {P - RiY 
w? + R|i/2 R | � ^ 2 + M 
w^ 一 (P — Ri)l|2 � P - R i w\ - (P - Ri)l 
The income distribution stasifies the condition as 
w\ > 2w? > 4^? 
3.3 Equilibrium Characterization : 1 
These conditions give us an insight into the ownership decision with respect to the 
comparison between the rate ofretum on ownership, the term i ^ / ( P — ^ i ) and the growth 
rate oftheir wealth adjusted with the cost and revenue from ownership. Ifthe rate ofretum 
is smaller than the lower threshold, group m will not buy ownership. If the rate is above 
> ^ 
the higher threshold, group m’s ownership decision equals to the interior solution 广.In 
case that the rate ofretum falls in the interval between two thresholds, group m will buy 
ownership as the comer solution 1 We can also see that higher housing prices increasing the 
cost and the higher future income w^ devaluating ownership retum in period 2 discourage 
households from buying housing; higher initial income w? providing sufficient budgets 
and higher expectation R^ putting up the retums lead to more consumption in ownership. 
When £P = 0 and t 二 ？, the aggregate demand fonction ofownership will be 
‘ w\ W^ P-Ri •> _^ 
2{P-Ri) 一 命 wY"-{P-Ri)i ^ ^T, 
n / p \ , < wii~^ Rl < P-R^ z ^1 (3.11) 
D(P) 二 1 2 [ p ^ y — 2k + €， ^^^？^  - - r - (^-^ i )^ - -^ , 
w^+w\ W^'+W^ • P-R\ ^ ^i. �2(P-Ri) 2^' W[--{P-Ri)i ^ w^+mi • 
Given the land supply 7i and the expectation on future land supply 7¾, it is easy to 
solve the equilibrium housing and rental prices P\ i?;,and R^ by the general equilibrium 
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oftwo markets with market clearing conditions (3.6-3,7). 
i ^ = i ^ ( ^ - P * ) , ( 3 . 1 2 ) 
i ^ r = 4 ^ 三 湖 ， 
72 + Q^7i 
< g ( 7 i ) f n _ Q 
^5+25(7l)71， ， 
p * - R； = _ ^ i 9 h | ) _ £rn 二 1 
1 ^ 5 + 2 ( 7 i - % ( 7 i ) ' ’ 
(wT+w^)9ir2) pm 二 ti^T-^;o--^>9^+27ig(7i)^r 
�ti;^+ti;5+27i5(7i)' 一 2(ti;-+iz;pg(7i) 
where P^ ^ = w[ + w? + vJ[ is the sum of wealth in the economy. We write the 
expectation rental price i?f as ^(72), the function 0 f 7 | . 
These equilibrium rental prices are easily understood with the characteristics ofthe 
Cobb-Doglas utility function, the portion a ofbudget adjusted after buying housing is spent 
on living. In period 1, the rental price is negative correlated with housing price because the 
separation ofthe housing market disperses the wealth and no credit is allowed in our model. 
The equilibrium housing price declines with the increase in land supply. 
We could rewrite equation (3.12), which actually gives us the equilibrium conditions 
for P* under different ownership distributions are 
‘ ^^+7ig(7i) — _ A i L r ^ = o , f ^ = 7 i , 
x .^ -7 i (p* - f i i ) ~ p * - ^ r … 
< ^^."+(7i-^")g(7i) — . g h | L t n = !，r = 〜—！, ( 3 . 1 3 ) 
w[-{i,-i){P*-RV “ P*-RV 
4+<+7ig(7i) — _^ _r 二 ^ r < - ^ + 2 7 i . ( 7 P < ^r 二 1 
�^[+^-7i(F--Ht) — P*-RV 2{wr+w[)9iY2) 
Given 7i and 7^, the incomes in the two periods ofthe group r evidently play a very 
important role on the equilibrium conditions because ofhis largescale consumption. 
From equation (3.11) and (3.12) , we find that future land supply affect ownership 
choices through g{Y2)' Compare the conditions of ownership choices in equation (3.10) 
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with the equilibrium condition in equation (3.13)，we get the relationship between the 
group m,s ownership decision and the expectation on land supply, 7| with the following 
formula: 
‘0, f - 譯 > (¾^ — ^)9{1ll 
r 二 1 2(¾^- — ^)9{ll) < 譯-辑 < ( ^ - • 湖 , 
? - , f - | < 2 ( ^ " - 4 ^ ) ^ ( 7 2 ) -
� 1 1 (3.14) 
Given the expectation j | , the series ofconditions actually is the result of the group 
m，s comparison between the growth rate ofthe net wealth given different ownerships in-
volved in the two-period incomes < , w ? and the rate of retum in market which greatly 
y j m 
depends on w\, w^. It is reasonable that the income growth rate ofthe household itself ^ 
need to be compared with the income growth rate ^ of group r since it has great influence 
on the market equilibrium. 
fyj^^ XV^ 1 
When the income growth rates of the group m and r are the same, ^ 二 巧，the 
ownership choices are independent ofthe future land supply, as in this case we have 
n hi > X U, wi，wY", 
pm — ^ � lAzl < X < 2(71-力 
么 — t , ^ur ^ wY" - wl ， 
7m — _J^ <1 X < 2r^, 
\ ^ - 2{P-Ri) 2Rl' w^ \ wl 
The demands ofhousing consumption and ownership have a linear relationship with 
incomes in two periods. When the households' incomes grow evenly, there are no twist 
in dynamic optimization and all of the housing demands keep certain proportion without 
varying. 
3.3 Equilibrium Characterization : 1 
• . W^ 
Consider the case where the growth rate of the middle-income class is higher, ^ > 
缓.We now show that the group m will buy more housing in period 1 as the expectation 
0f72 decreases from equation (3.14). We define three composite parameters by 
— a ( 2 < ^ 7 i - wli)W2 
Fi = {wlw^ - w^w^)‘ 
_ a{2w^^^-wlI-2w^l)W2 
r2 二 {w[w^ 一 w^wl) ， 
— a ( 2 i < 7 i — W^i-^^^ly^i. 
「3 二 {wlwf - wY"wl) . 
Lemma 1 I f l < ^ ^ ^ , then 
f 
0, 72 ^ [ r i - ( l - c ^ ) 7 i , 7 - 7 i ] , 
r 二 ^^(7^2)三 1 72 € [r3 — (1 — a)7 i ,^2 — (1 — c^)7i], (3.15) 
？爪, 7 2 e [ 0 , r 3 - ( l - Q ^ ) 7 i ) -
\ 
jYhen 1 > :J+7;, the group m will never have the ajfordability topurchase the ownership 
at the level o f h and even 1 a case where only the rich group owns all the land inperiod 
1. 
Proof. See the Appendix. • 
The range ofexpected 73 does not cover (Fi — (1 一 o07i,F2 — (1 — o^hi)- The future 
land supply 72 can not be chosen at any level with fixed 71 for ensuring market clearing, 
because the minimum r e q u i r e m e n t l b r i n g s ajump in the demand curve. 
The influence of 7^ on £^ could be divided into two different parts, the direct and 
indirect effects, which would help us in explaining the monotony of 广 refering to j | with 
A yjTT^ W^ 1 
different patterns of income growth. From the expression o f C 二 2{P*-Ri) — 2 ^ ' the 
last part stands for the direct effect of 72 which is negative for all the income patterns 
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when 7§ increases. I f the land supply in the future increases, the rental price at that time 
will decrease so the smaller saving from homeownership undermines households' desire 
to buy housing today. However, the other effect, which corresponds to the first part ofthe 
equation and which is indirect as it is also influenced by the changing of housing price 
due to 7塞 variations, would be different for income patterns. From equation (3.13)，it is 
easy to find out that this indirect effect will be positive for all people. The larger the land 
supply, the lower housing price is. Thus, households want to buy more housing. However, 
if the income of the middle-income group grows faster than that of the rich, this indirect 
effect is not enough to counteract the negative direct effect. In this condition, the total 
influence of 7¾ on £爪 is negative. When the income growth rate of the rich is larger, the 
indirect effect will be large enough to balance the direct effects and the relation o f ^ and 
7f will be positive. Why will the results be different with income growth pattem? Because, 
in relative terms, the indirect effect is more moderate as it works through the housing 
price which changes with the total incomes of all the households in housing market. Its 
coefficient is plus by the average growth rate while the correspondent ofdirect effect is the 
growth rate of the middle. 
Lemma 2 Going to period 2’ the median voter needs to solve problem (3,9) by choosing 
72 given i^ = f^(7|). R2 二 乂72) because the rental market clearing condition still holds 
(3.8/ The solution can be concluded as 
( 
〜 0’ ?^(75) > ^ ^ ^ ,,,., 
7卜％(广(7黑))三{ 〜 饥 (3.16) 
7 - 7 i , ^ ^ ( 7 E ) < a ^ ^ -
\ 
where a 二 (1 — a ) 7 i — ( 7 — 7 i ) / [ ( ( i - I h , — T ^ ) (】— "）—工 . 
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Proof. See the Appendix. • 
The self-fulfilling equilibria, which are satisfied 7^ 二 �2(一 (75) )=呢' 
Under the condition % > 4 , we distinguish the following two cases. 
W^ W^ 
. ( C a s e 1): If 
么 > - ^ j < + (1 - a ) < l 7 : ^ l (3.17) 
a W 2 u)? + ^1 L 2aM^2 . 
there is only one equilibrium in the model. 
• 
( 0 , 7 - 7 i ) , 7 - a 7 1 > r 1 , 
(C^,7;)=<^ ^ 7 - 7 i ) , r 3 < 7 - ^ 7 i < T 2 , (3.18) 
� ( f " ( 7 - 7 i ) , 7 - 7 i ) . 7 -Q^7 i < r s -
八 � � � __ /^  N i^-Oi^^)iw^wl-w^wl) 
where ^ - ( 7 — 7i) 二 ^ ^ _切「+ “ — <^r 2 a ^ A w l . 
(Case 2): If 
< ^ < 7 i r ^ m + ( 1 — . < ^ 2 - < ^ q ( 3 . 1 9 ) 
^ ^ ^ < T ^ r ^ ) 2al^ 2 J 
besides the equilibrium in equation (3.18), there will be another one in the model, as 
(卞 「 , 、1^；7^切5 — 1^?^1(；11 .\ 
{ t 7;)二（ ~ " - ~ ~ w ? + 1 - oO 1 ‘ , , , ，0 
^^rn:l2J yujmj^^T _ 1 � 2aWs J J 
The above derivation leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition 3 (1) I f % 二 ^ o r 譯 > 錄 with the condition holds in (ZA1), there exists 
a unique equilibrium. 
(2)When ^ > ^ and the landsupply 7i satisfies ftA9), that is the income ofthe 
group m growsfaster than that ofthe rich one r, there exists multiple equilibria ofland 
supply 72. 
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In case the housing price is acceptable, the middle-income group, with the expecta-
tion that the government will not lease much land, has the incentive to buy adequate housing 
to retrench considerable cost ofrenting or even take earnings in period 2. Then, there is no 
doubt that the homeowner hopes for the highest future rental price, namely least land sup-
ply. Supposing people believe in a large land supply for the next period, the middle-income 
group will buy less housing in spite of lower housing price and certainly prefer the low-
est rental price to reduce consumption. This also reveals that the decision to buy housing 
depends more on rental yields rather than housing price. 
3.4 Comparative Statics 
Proposition 4 I f � i s less than the solution ^^ofequation ft20), there is only one equi-
librium, where 7^ 二 ’ - 7i wi!! decrease andt^ weakly increases as 71 grows. Once 7i is 
over 7i, it bring one more equilibrium where ？丄 haspositive relationship with t^ anddoes 
not affect on the amount of^\. 
<,—Ti. r ^ + (1 — . < ^ 2 - < ^ q (3.20) 
^ ^ - < + ^ i r ^ 2aW2 J 
The relationship between 71 and C is evident. With the lower land supply in period 
1, the housing price is so high that median voter cannot afford ownership ofenough area for 
living. Regardless of his choice of £^, and expectation of 72, he still prefers the maximum 
72 in the period 2 because the rent he need to pay for living outstrips his gains from the 
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ownership. If the land supply 7i is above a specific level 7 ” the type of constraint is 
removed and we can find multiple equilibria. 
Proof. See the Appendix. • 
Proposition 5 The change o f l has no influence on 7^ In the equilibrium with 7$ 二 
7 — hAm 冰瓜 drop as 1 increases. 
We set 
一 2aM^2 r^7i - (7 一 a7 i )K^r —《叫 )^ 
Hi 二 awlW2 , 
—2aW2W^^^ - (7 - c^7i )K^2" - ^ r ^ 2 ) 
n2 二 aW2{w{ + 2w^) , 
— 2 a w ^ j ^ W 2 - (7 — a 7 i ) K ^ r - ^ r ^ 2 ) 
Hs = 2a{w\ + wT)W2 . 
0, i > U u 
C^= 1 n3<^"<n2, 
?饥(，一71)， ^ < n s -
\ 
Butifl>^^a, t^^landHl-li)-
In another equilibrium with 7^ 二 0, t ^ is independent with 1 
Proof. See the Appendix. • 
We could regard the area ofa small dwelling-size house in the market as the minimum 
requirement 1 for ownership, which indeed affects a household's buying behavior. For the 
middle-income group, the much expense of owning a large-scale flat paid in period 1 is 
likely to break the principle of smooth consumption, especially when the land supply 72 is 
too large to yield any satisfactory return. 1 only set in housing buy-sell market, does not 
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The history of land and housing markets in Hong Kong, which have inconsistent 
land supply policies, makes it possible to observe how the expectation enforces itself. The 
"85,000 Planning", which was an attempt to mitigate the housing mania by enlarging the 
land supply, failed in a way that was not envisioned by the policy makers. We interpret 
the abandonment ofthe policy as a fight-back by those who have vested interest in housing 
prices. History shows that they won. 
As mentioned in the introduction, land regulations and other urban planning policy 
such as urban boundary, zoning, etc, can be viewed as tools influencing land supply in a 
city/metropolitan area, and hence the theory in this model applies more generally. As is 
also evident from the case ofHong Kong, limiting land supply for an extended period of 
time may, in fact, creates a trap, in which people enjoy only a small amount ofhousing but 
pays huge rental payments, and there is no easy way to get out ofthis trap. Compared to 
the other equilibrium, this trap amounts to redistributing the income from the poor to the 
rich. In fact, Hong Kong has one of the highest Gini coefficient of family income in the 
world, and it is 53.3 in 2007 according to the CIA World factbook. 
As to why the limitation was there in the first place is certainly an interesting question, 
but we do not attempt to answer this question in this thesis. It is certainly desirable to study 
this question in the future. One natural way to model this is to adopt a more general model 
ofpolitical economy to endogenously determine who the agenda-setter will be. Ifsomehow 
31 
the rich emerges as the equilibrium agenda-setter, it is，ofcourse, to their benefit to choose 
the equilibrium favoring them, i.e., one with the low land supply. 
32 
Appendix 
Proof ofLemma 1 
We solve the ownership decision 广 as the ftinction of the expectation on land supply 
7^ 2 by analyzing equation (3.14). Consider the condition 導 > 辑，we distinguish the 
following three cases. 
(Case 1): I f ^ ^ < 凑,or ^ ^ > 去 a n d ) , ^ [1\ — (1 — a ) 7 , , 7 - 7i], then 
r = 0 
(Case 2): If ^ > ：^ and 7^ 2 ^ � 3 — (1 — ^)7i,T2 一 (1 — ^)7i], 
or ^ < ; , < ^ f ^ and j | ^ [。，[2 — (1 一 o07i), then 
W^ 叫1 山1 
lm 二 1 
(Case 3): If 穿—> ^ and j | ^ [0, [3 — (1 — <^)li). then 
7 — 7^ 
^m 一 ^ 
Summarize as 
Tf / < J<2L. then 
丄1 t�wY"+wl , ^eu 
f 
0, 72 e [Fi - ( l - a ) 7 i , 7 - 7 i ] . 
r 二 1 72 e [r3 一 (1 - o07i，r2 — (1 - Q^)7il, 
� h , 7^G [0,r3-(l-cv)7i)-
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I f J ^ < ^ - < J ^ 2 : j ^ , t h e n 
w^'+wl — — 2w^+w\ ‘ 
f 
0, 72 e [ri-(l-a)7i,7-7il, 
『二 1 7 ^ 2 G [ 0 , r 2 - ( l - a ) 7 i ] , 
� ^ i ^ . 
I f 2 < ' i i < £ - < M ; 2 l , t h e n 
上1 2wY'+w\ — ^  \ w[ ’ 
0, 7 2 ^ [ ^ i - ( 1 - Q ^ ) 7 i , 7 - 7 i ] , 
广 二 < 
+ 1 � . 
\ 
I f ^ < A t h e n 
r = 0,V72 
l n c a s e ^ < ^ , i f ^ < ^ " t h e n 
( 
0， 7 2 e [ 0 , F i — ( 1 - ^ 0 7 i ] , 
r 二 1 72 e [P2 - (1 — Q^)7i,r3 — (1 一 o07i], 
？爪’ 72 e ( r s — (1 一 o 0 7 i , 5 - 7 i : . 
v 
Proof of Lemma 2 
Solve the problem (3.9) with the solutions in (3.3) and (3.5) 
m a x V r 二 y ( l — W ( i - " ) W + R2nRr 
7 2 
where R2 = ^(72).The first and second-order derivative 0fV2^ with respect to 72 are 
爬 时"1 "、/1」,?一-1丨(1 —。 ) ^瓜—_『 ]网 
^ 二 -0^  + (l-W )¾ (72 + (l-W7l)2 
g2yrn 2(72 + (1 一 ^ 7 l ) [ ( l — 以 ) 广 — ^ ¾ < ¾ " ' ! 一 K^ — … 广 — ( 以 + l X ^ 2 > ' ^ 2 ^ ^ 2 
^ 二 a - i - a ( l - a ) ( - i ) ( 7 2 + (1 — C^)7l)'^S^2'' 
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When ^ = 0, that is 
. ( l - a ) r W 2 ,1 � 
、二-~"^ (1 — 咖 
^2 
group m's utility is minimum. 
Due to 0 < 72 < 7 - 7i, we further induce the optimal choice 0f72 at the comer 
solutions. 
V^2"(O)-^2"(7-71) 
— ( 1 — a ) ( " ) K + 纖 ) — ( 1 — � ) ( 1 - ’ 2 + 二 1 % 7 1 ) 
二 (购）。 ( ， 、 ^ ((l-a)7i) V,-7i + (l-a)7" 
(1 - a—2 [ 7 ? - ( 铁 + 7 i ) 1 + � H y - [7?—1 - ( 货 广 1 : 
二 ^ 
(Case 1): Ifthe following holds 
7 - 7 i < ^2 or 
^2^(0) > VJ^ (7 — 7i) and 71 < % < 7 — 7i 
then 
y j m 
t o ’ ^ - > ^ -
where a =(1 — a )7i — (i+, 7、 !"^) (1-^) -1 
ViT(l_a)7l (l-a) ^ 
(Case 2): Ifthe following holds 
0 < 7 — 7i < 72 or 
^2^(0) > V^ (7 — 7i) ’ and 7! < 72 < 7 — 7i 
then 
7 2 ( 。 " - 7 1 ， 广 < 蔬 7 
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Summarize as , 
〜 0, H l l ) >盖… 
il = U r { i l ) ) ^ { � m 
7 - 7 i , n i i ) < ^ ^ -
\ 
Proof ofProposition 4 
‘ � W? 7l [ m i M .WTWI-W^W[' 
咖 二 ^ t ^ ; ^ h + ( ) 2 a ^ . 
^ 1 < 0 
^ 7 i 
When 7i is smaller so the condition (3.17) holds, we can conclude the effect 0f71 on 
equilibrium land supply and group m,s ownership decision from (3.18) 
( 0 , 7 - 7 i ) , 7 i < ¥ ， 
( M ) = l ( ^ , 7 - 7 i ) , ^ < 7 i < ^ ^ 
^ ( ? " ( 7 - 7 i ) , 7 - 7 i ) , 7 i > ^ -
I f 7 i increases to over 71 which makes F(j,) 二 0, the condition (3.19) will hold so 
that there exists two equilibria in the model. 
Proof ofProposition 5 
From (3.18), we can solve the trasholds ofTto lead to different equilibrium result. 
We set 
—2aW2w]^J1 - (7 - c ^ 7 i ) K ^ r - ^ r ^ 2 ) 
Hi 二 aw{W2 ， 
— 2 a V ^ 2 ^ r 7 i — (7 一 Q 7 i ) K ^ r — ^i^l) 
^2 = “ aW2(wl + 2wT) ’ 
一 2a<'7iV^2 - (7 - ct^1){<^2 - ^T^2) 




0， ^ > H i , 
C = 1 n s < ^ < n 2 , 
^ ? " ( 7 - 7 i ) , ^ < n 3 . 
t ^ will drop as 1 increases. Besides this, we need to compare 1 with the threshold in 
(3.16). I f ^ > ^ a , then C + ^'andF-(7 一 7i). 
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